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This study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system. The purpose is to investigate some of the economic profession's fundamental assumptions about the nature of international trade. The concept of multiple "countries" in which each country has its own technology, preferences, and resource endowments, is introduced and operationalized. The questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage, factor-price equalization, terms of trade, efficiency in production, and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions. The study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena. ' Because this paper carries laboratory experimental research to a new dimension of complexity and into a new field, it might be useful to address what would be the obvious concern of a skeptic. Since the world's international economies are vastly more complicated than the economies created for this study, of what relevance are laboratory-generated data? The answer is that laboratory experiments are not attempts to simulate field situations, as that question of the skeptic seems to presume. Laboratory research deals with the general theories and the general principles that are supposed to apply to all economies, the economies found in the field as well as those created in a laboratory. The laboratory economies are very simple and are special cases of the broad class of (often complex) economies to which the general theories are supposed to be of relevance. If a general theory does not work successfully to explain behavior in the sim-ple and special cases of the laboratory, then it is not general. When a model is found not working, opportunity exists to modify the theory to account for the data or to reject the theory. Thus, the laboratory provides an arena in which competing notions and theories about the nature of human (and market) capacities can be joined with data. Clearly laboratory experimental work is constrained by technology, and by background experimental work. When very little background work exists, the experimental research strategy is first to explore what seem to be the most basic and general theoretical ideas. Then, as technology permits, successful ideas can be challenged with increasingly complex experimental environments in follow-up experiments. Any laboratory experiment should be viewed as only one of the many steps needed to learn what we would like to know. This study is no different.
The focus of the study is the behavior of the entire economic system, rather than the behavior of individual agents. Two behavioral models, "competitive equilibrium" and "autarky," can be applied to the experimental environments. Both models make precise predictions of the magnitude of every variable in the system, which number in the dozens. The existence of such a large number of predictions creates methodological and expositional problems. With a large number of predictions, some predictions will almost certainly be wrong. The sheer size of the undertaking makes it very easy to reject the models statistically. Therefore, after making a clear statement of the negative result that the models are rejected, the analysis of the data focuses on the general properties of interdependent markets that are suggested by the models, as opposed to a focus on the accuracy of the specific predictions of each model. In the context of the broad implications of the models, a number of results are stated.
The paper is organized in the following manner. We begin by discussing in Section I the existing support found in field data for the basic principles we test. In Sections II and III, the design of the experiments is described. In Section IV, the theoretical models are discussed. In Section V, the data are presented and analyzed, and in Section VI, the conclusions are summarized.
I. Field-Data Support for Major Principles
The propositions that we propose to explore are so basic to accepted theory and are applied so universally, that some might wonder why we would bother. Is it the case that the law of comparative advantage and the principle of factor-price equalization are well documented and not controversial? We think not. Nagging doubts linger because no direct evidence exists. Empirical results in support of the most basic principles of international-trade theory are clouded as they always are when the data are from field sources. As Michael P. Porter (1990 p. 12) writes, "Evidence hard to reconcile with factor comparative advantage is not difficult to find."
In his handbook chapter on testing trade theories, Alan Deardorff (1984) discusses the general problem of testing trade theories using field data. He cites two types of problems. First, simple trade models omit important features of the world economy, so model specification is an inherent problem. For example, the models usually assume only two countries, and they typically ignore transport costs. On the other hand, field data are generated by countries trading with many other countries in a world in which transportation costs exist and are often thought to be important. The second general problem is that theories tend to be stated in terms of variables that are not observable, so that testing these theories directly with field data is not possible. An example is the theory of comparative advantage.
The theory of comparative advantage is a general theory which states that countries will export that good which has the lowest relative price in autarky. However, attempts to test and assess the theory have only been indirect. In principle, this theory cannot be tested directly with field data because conditions of autarky and thus autarky prices are rarely, if ever, observed. In order to cope with this problem, researchers have sider all of the OECD countries and use more sophisticated techniques. Their findings suggest that factor prices are converging within the OECD if countries are properly grouped into high-wage and low-wage countries. Furthermore, their evidence suggests that it is trade liberalization that accounts for much of this convergence. The evidence on factor-price equalization is far from conclusive.
The experimental data do not have many of the problems that are associated with field data. The experimental data are generated by only two countries. Transportation costs are under the control of the experimenter. The underlying structure is known. Variables unavailable in the field, like autarky prices, are known in the experiment. Factor prices can be observed under autarky and under free trade. In the field, neither can be observed. The field data on labor, for example, involves a great deal of aggregation across different types of labor. This means that one actually compares average wages of a group of workers in one country with the average wage of a different group in another country. If there is much variation across countries in groups, or if these groups change over time, a bias is introduced which may affect the results. No such problems exist in experiments.
Of course, experimental data are generated by much simpler economic environments than those found in the field. The preconditions for the operations of the principles have been introduced by the experimenters. The experiments are able to provide some insights into how models, based on the basic principles, are able to organize the data, given that the situation is one in which the model can be meaningfully applied. The experiment cannot, however, answer the equally important questions about the relative likelihood that nature has created a situation for which the parametric and institutional features of the model are relevant.
II. Experimental Design: Parameters
This section consists of a description of the market conditions within which the economic activity occurs. The description in-cludes the environment, the parameters, and the form of market organization used to facilitate transactions. There are two environments: the first is motivated by the environment of the Ricardian Model of international trade;2 the second is a similar environment, within which the robustness of results can be investigated and in which the properties of input markets can be considered in greater detail. All markets were organized through the computerized multiple unit double auction (MUDA). For details of the operation of this form of market organization, the reader can consult Plott (1991) .
Money exists in both environments. Thus, the first environment, although similar to that of the Ricardian model, differs in that the purchase of any good requires money. Money is included in the design because it is an obvious feature of any well-functioning market process, including international economies, and it is certainly useful in experimental environments in facilitating equilibration. In both environments, there is 1  600  620  1  600  450  1  600  450  520  540  250  400  250  400  440  480  200  50  200  50  360  400  280  320  2  550  500  2  550  500  200  240  300  350  300  350  120  160  150  100  150  100  40  80   2  560  660  3  500  550  3  500  550  480  580  350  300  350  300  400  500  100  150  100  150  320  420  4  450  600  4  450  600  240  340  400  250  400  250  180  260  50  200  50  200  100  180  20  100  20   3  560  660  480  580  400  500  320  420  240  340  180  260  100  180  20  100  20   4  520  700  440  620  360  540  280  460  200  380  120  300  40  220  140  60 only one currency, and it has value as a commodity. All experimental currency held by subjects at the end of the experiment could be converted into dollars that the subject keeps as compensation for participation in the experiment. Since the focus of experimentation is international trade rather than finance, the complicating feature of multiple currencies has been omitted from the design. Table 1 presents the experimental parameters for both of the environments that will be discussed below. Continuous approximations of the utility functions of both consumers and producers are quadratic and additively separable as shown in Table 1 . The actual redemption values that were induced are contained in Table 2 Agents are divided in equal numbers into two countries. Each country includes as members equal numbers of consumers and producers. The factor of production is not mobile between countries. The final goods Y and Z can be traded in either country, not only the one in which they were produced. The two countries differ only in their production technologies.
The economy works in the following way. Consumers sell their endowment of L to producers in their own country and then buy units of Y and Z produced in either country. Consumers get utility (U.S. dollars) from consumption and any profits made in price speculation. Producers in each country buy L from the consumers in their own country and can use L to produce Y and Z which they can sell to consumers in either country. Producers get utility (dollars) from profits earned from market and production activities.
In some experiments, free international trade was permitted; in others a tariff was imposed on the imports of Z to country 1. When a tariff was in effect, it took the form of a tax of 400 francs on international transactions of the final goods. The tariff revenue was not redistributed to citizens in either country but instead was taken by the experimenter. Thus, the tariff operated similarly to a transportation cost.
B. Environment 2
In environment 2, the two countries have different endowments of the inputs. In addition, the inputs are endogenously and elastically supplied to producers in the sense that resources could also be consumed. Environment 2 operated as a control on environment 1 to ensure that any properties of input markets observed in environment 1 were not simply due to the completely inelastic supply of the input. The endogenous-resource property of environment 2 is a natural feature to add as a check on robustness of a model's ability to capture observed behavior because it is a general property of the field economies in which the competitive and autarky models are regularly applied.
In Consumers sell their endowment of inputs to producers in their own country, and consumers buy units of Y and Z produced in either country. Producers can buy L and K from consumers in their own country. Producers can consume any part of the purchases of L and K and can use the remainder to produce Y and Z, which they can then sell in either country.
III. Experimental Design: Procedures
A total of ten experiments were conducted. Table 3 provides a summary of treatments. Experiments are indexed by the date of the experiment. Two subject pools were used. The experiments involved either 8 people or 16 people. The use of 8 people for some experiments was dictated by cost and difficulties in recruiting subjects.
In the conditions of environments 1 and 2, there were six and eight markets, respectively, operating simultaneously.3 Each variable had its own market (e.g., output Yi, Y produced in country i, had its own market). The production process allowed subjects to transfer units from and to inventories of certain markets in fixed ratios. Production was accomplished through a series of keystrokes. To consume units, subjects held them in their inventory at the end of a market period.
Subjects, undergraduates at the California Institute of Technology and at the University of Iowa, had at least one half hour of prior training in use of MUDA.4 The MUDA software is accompanied by a tutorial that explains the key functions to subjects and lets subjects practice using the keys in an environment containing randomly behaving robots. The Appendix contains instructions read to subjects. During period 0 and period 1, accounting records were checked carefully for mistakes, and spot checks were conducted in later periods.
The experiment was divided into trading periods or trading "days." At the beginning of each, subjects received new endowments and redemption values which were the same each period. At the beginning of the experiment there was a long practice period (period 0) for 15 minutes in which no money was paid. Market periods averaged 10 minutes in length.
3The names L and K were not used to label the markets in any experiments because they might suggest behavior to the subjects if they thought that L and K represented labor and capital. The labels used in markets are explained in the Appendix.
Although Caltech subjects were only allowed to participate in one experiment in this particular line of experimentation, some of the Caltech subjects had been in other market experiments. None of the University of Iowa subjects had been in other market experiments previously, although experiments 041391A and 041391B used only subjects who had been in one of the previous experiments in the series.
IV. Models
The models described below rely on strong assumptions. The complex environments of the experimental markets are much richer than those that the models describe. However, experimental economics has demonstrated that models frequently have surprising power even when applied to environments much more complex than the structure of the models. The questions that will ultimately be posed concern the identification of models that can provide intuition needed for help with the interpretation of market data.
A. The Competitive Model
This section contains a brief elaboration and review of the competitive model. The computation and description of the competitive equilibria for both environments are in a technical appendix which is available from the authors upon request. Recall that the first environment has two outputs, both of which can be produced with the same input, paralleling that of the Ricardian model of international trade. In the Ricardian environment there are two final goods, Y and Z, each of which is produced using one factor, L. There are two countries which may differ in their endowments of the factor. The factor cannot cross national boundaries and is supplied inelastically to the markets. The two countries are assumed to have different production functions so that each country has a comparative advantage in production of one of the goods. Without loss of generality, call the country with a comparative advantage in the production of Y country 1. The two countries have identical aggregate demand for both goods. In autarky, the price ratio Pz/Py should be greater in country 1 than in country 2. That is, country 1 can produce good Y more cheaply in terms of good Z then can country 2. If trade between the two countries is permitted, then comparative advantage dictates that country 1 specializes in and exports good Y. Similarly, country 2 specializes in and exports good Z. If the final goods are traded without restrictions, the prices of the final goods, Y and Z, will be the same across countries and the price of L generally will be different in each country.
Thus, for environment 1, the competitive model predicts that countries 1 and 2 would produce exclusively goods Y and Z, respectively, and that each of the two countries would be a net exporter of the output which it produces. In particular country 1 would produce only Y, and country 2 would produce only Z. The prices of the outputs would be equal in each country according to the model, and the prices of inputs would equal their marginal revenue products.
If a tariff were imposed on the country-1 imports of Z in environment 1, then according to the competitive model international trade of Z would decline. The price of Z in country 1 would increase, and the price of Z in country 2 would fall. The input price in country 2 would also decline, since its marginal revenue product would be lower. The tariff imposed was 400 francs.
In environment 2, the competitive model predicts that each country would produce both output goods. Country 1, however, would be a net exporter of Y, and country 2 would be a net exporter of Z. Under conditions of free trade, the prices of outputs would be equal across countries. Since derived demand would be identical in both countries, then the factor prices would also be the same and would equal the factors' marginal revenue product. The price of each of the four types of goods in country 1 would equal its price in country 2. The prediction of the equality of input prices across countries in environment 2 will be referred to as the factor-price equalization principle. Notice that for the parameter values imposed in this environment, factorprice equalization is predicted even though the factors cannot be traded internationally.
B. Autarky
A natural alternative model to use is the autarky model. It is useful because it characterizes one benchmark of the potential behavior which a system might exhibit. Its predictions are based upon the proposition that no trade will occur across national boundaries. This model predicts the prices and production levels in each country which would occur in a competitive equilibrium with no international transactions permitted. This model thus offers specific predictions of prices, patterns of production, international trade, and the effects of tariffs. For environment 1, the autarky model predicts that specialization would not occur in either country, and that there would be no international trade or payment imbalances. Since there is no trade across national boundaries, the predictions of this model are unaffected by the imposition of tariffs. According to the autarky model, prices of all goods would be different in the two countries.
The autarky model also makes predictions concerning production and trade in the two countries in environment 2. Both countries produce both goods but in different quantities than in the competitive equilibrium. Autarky predicts that there will be no international trade and that both input and output prices will be different across countries. The wage-price ratio predictions are identical to those predicted by the competitive model. There should be no payment imbalances. The predictions of the autarky model are computed in a similar way to the competitive model. The computations are available from the authors upon request.
The specific predictions of the two models in the two environments are given in Table 4 
C. Efficiency
The efficiency measurements in our experiments were first developed by Plott and Smith (1978) . In a single market the system is operating at 100-percent efficiency if the total profit that all subjects make in an experiment is at a maximum. It is similar to maximizing consumer plus producer surplus.
In a general-equilibrium system the problem becomes a little tricky. Because of the single currency in these experiments, the gains from exchange are exhausted at the maximum of system profits in terms of the experimental currency, francs. Actual profits divided by the maximum possible becomes the measure of system efficiency. Efficiency is 100 percent if the competitive equilibrium is attained. When tariffs were imposed, the government revenues were treated the same as were the profits of individuals and, therefore, included as part of the "consumer surplus" that was created by exchange. Several useful impressions can be drawn from the figures. First, the data are not automatically clustered at the competitive equilibria. This is perhaps no surprise to those who have studied the properties of experimental markets, but the fact that markets are not always automatically at the competitive equilibrium is of substantial importance to those who must use equilibrium theories as a specification tool in the interpretation of field data. Secondly, the prices over time move toward the competitive equilibria. This power of the competitiveequilibrium model in predicting the direction of the movement in these complicated markets is also observed in simpler economic environments. The formal statements of results in this section will make these general impressions precise.
The analysis of the data of this section encounters some classical problems that exist in the analysis of almost all data produced in experimental markets. Markets exhibit a convergence process that is not understood theoretically. From a practical point of view, this means that serial correlation is present, and heteroscedasticity may be present. In the absence of a welldeveloped theory of a convergence process, such statistical complications create substantial problems with any attempt to summarize succinctly the patterns that may exist in the data. weight of Bil is small because 1/t approaches zero while the weight of B2 is large because (t-1)/t approaches 1. Notice that B2 is common to all experiments. Finally, u is the random error term that is distributed normally with mean zero. We allow for heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.
. OUTPUT-PRICE TIME SERIES, EXPERIMENT 041391A: PRICES OF Y IN BOTH COUNTRIES (UPPER GRAPH) AND PRICES OF Z IN BOTH COUNTRIES (LOWER GRAPH
The model is equipped to answer questions about the direction of convergence. Each experiment might have a different starting point, but according to the intuition of competitive-market theory, the processes should converge, and the ultimate point of convergence should be the same (the competitive equilibrium quantities). For purposes of describing the data, the term "weak convergence" is used when the start of the data, as measured by B1i, is further from the predictions of the model than is the asymptote, as measured by B2.
The model was estimated for each of the relevant dependent variables, and the results of the estimates are contained in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's method (see Halbert White, 1980), as well as first-order autocorrelation. The model was estimated for each of the treatconverge to a different value for each experimental session. Specification 2 is nonlinear; we estimate the B, a, and y terms. The functional form was based on an ex post inspection of the data. It allows the time series to converge at different rates in the different experimental sessions but requires all of the data to converge to a common asymptote. The estimates of the alternative specifications are not given here, because they do not improve upon the specification used in the text. Specification 1 yields adjusted R2's, estimated coefficients, and standard errors close to those of the specification given in the text. The nonlinear specification 2 also yields comparable adjusted R2's but very large standard errors, especially for the price variables, so that usually neither the competitive model nor the autarky model could be rejected. Figures 2 and 3 , that the transaction prices seem to be moving toward the competitive-equilibrium prices over time. While this tendency of convergence will ultimately be shown to be true, the first pass at the data holds to strict standards. As can be seen the prices are not at the competitive equilibrium. As we indicated earlier, in economic systems as complicated as these, it is very easy to statistically reject the benchmark models. This indeed proved true.
The first result is important because it shapes the entire discussion. It demonstrates that neither the competitive model nor the autarky model accurately represents the data generated by the experiments. Such a result is not particularly surprising to those who have studied the behavior of experimental markets. The market prices and quantities traded, as predicted by the competitive model, are often rejected, and the autarky model is usually rejected as well. The models are static, while the actual markets exhibit considerable dynamic and adjustment behavior, the very existence of which is sufficient to reject the models. However, Result 1 is especially interesting because of the power brought to the analysis by the econometric model introduced above. The result says that, even after the model has been modified to incorporate differential adjustment rates in different experimental sessions, both models can still be rejected.
RESULT 1: Both the competitive model and the autarky model can be rejected as accurate representations of the data.
SUPPORT:
Rejection of the models rests on the fact that each of the models makes numerous predictions. Of course, rejection only re- Tables 5, 6 , and 7 for each of the treatment conditions, environment 1 with and without tariffs, and environment 2. A summary of significance tests of the two models and variables is provided in each of the tables. As can be seen in Table 5 , the autarky model is rejected for every variable in environment 1 (no tariff) at the p < 0.005 level of significance for eight of the ten variables and at the p < 0.05 level for the other two variables. As shown in Table 7 , all price predictions of the autarky model are incorrect in environment 2, as are its predictions of exports and of production of Y in both countries. The autarky model performs best under environment 1 (tariff), as shown in Table 6 , but even in this case, two of the variables are significantly different from the predictions of the model at the 0.005 level of significance. Under the conditions of environment 1 (no tariff) the competitive model fails to predict two of the four production variables, the prices of L2, Y, and Z. Under the conditions of environment 1 (tariff), the competitive model fails to predict three of the six aggregate production and export levels, as well as the prices in two of the four markets. In all cases, the significance level supporting rejection is at least 0.05. As for environment 2, the competitive model is rejected for seven of the 14 variables at the 0.05 level of significance.
It is important to note, as is clear from the tables, that the competitive model has some merit when one compares the coefficients B1i to B2. The remaining results are attempts to summarize those aspects of the competitive and autarky models that are successful. The general theme is that convergence of the data over time, with replication of the market, is in the general direction of the competitive equilibria and that the autarky model is firmly rejected. In particular, several qualitative features of the competitive model are very prominent in the data and are described by the next series of results.
Result 2 summarizes observations concerning whether or not the law of comparative advantage can be seen in operation. The notion is that countries export the output in whose production they have a comparative advantage. Recall that when applied to the parameters of environment 1, the law of comparative advantage holds that country 1 should specialize in and be a net exporter of good Y. Country 2 should specialize in and be a net exporter of Z. RESULT 3: Aggregate production patterns are conuerging toward those predicted by the competitive model under free trade.
As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, a weak definition of the phrase ''converging toward" is that the data are either at (statistically) the competitive equilibria at the end of the experiment or closer to the competitive equilibria at the end of the experiment than they were at the beginning. A stronger definition is that the data are converging to quantities that are not significantly different from the competitiveequilibrium predictions. As we stated in Result 1, we reject the notion that the outcome variables are converging to the competitive predictions in the strong sense. However, The results under the conditions of environment 1 (tariff) are not so uniformly supportive of the result. For example, the production of Y1 is converging in only two of the three experiments for which coefficients B11 and B13 equal 14 and 27, respectively, B2 is 28, and the competitive equilibrium is 36 units produced. In summary, for the tariff experiments, of the 12 cases (two countries, two commodities, and three experiments), only eight support the result. In environment 2, the movement in nine of the 12 cases is toward the competitive equilibrium.
As for the autarky model, in environment 1, without tariffs, none of the 16 production levels is converging in the weak sense. Under tariffs, however, nine of the 12 variables converge to autarky in the weak sense. In 
The deviation in individual consumption from the quantities predicted in the competitive model are diminishing over time (see Table 8 ). In the table, the data are pooled for all of the experimental sessions. From the table, it is evident that the absolute values of the deviations are smaller in the later periods than in the earlier periods. For example, the mean deviations from the competitive equilibrium fall consistently over the first four periods for both Y and Z.
Similarly, the standard deviations during the first periods are higher than those in the last periods. The hypothesis that the absolute value of the deviations for periods 1-3 are smaller than or equal to those for periods 7-11 can be rejected at p < 0.01. 
The addition of tariffs on imports

SUPPORT:
The relevant data are for environment 1. Average net exports per period are 10.3 without the tariffs and 2.8 under tariffs. We reject the hypothesis at the p <0.01 level that exports of Z are lower or equal under free trade than under tariffs. Refer again to Figure 6 , which depicts consumption in the two countries in all experiments in the condition of environment 1 with and without tariffs. Market efficiency under tariffs is compared to that without tariffs for the pooled environment-1 data in Figure 7 . As can be seen for each period, average efficiency under the no-tariff condition is higher than average efficiency of the tariff condition. We reject the hypothesis that efficiency is equal in the two conditions or 6System efficiency is measured as actual social income (in francs) divided by social income at the competitive equilibrium under free trade. The tariff revenue is included as social income in our calculation of actual social income. See Plott and Smith (1978) for a discussion of this concept in a single-market economy. In a multiple-market economy the measure can be influenced by scale choices. higher under tariffs (p < 0.05). We also reject the hypothesis, using the rank-sum test, that the prices of L2 or the prices of Z2 are equal under the tariff and in the absence of the tariff. The average prices of L2 and Z2 are 550 and 467, respectively, under no-tariff conditions and are respectively 402 and 380 under tariffs. As the competitive model predicts, they are both lower in the tariff case.
Result 5 can be viewed as a type of comparative-static result, but the comparisons are not exactly like those that are studied in theory. In the theory of comparative statics, a comparison is made between the equilibrium state before a tariff and the equilibrium state after a tariff. The comparison made in Result 5 is between the disequilibrium states as opposed to equilibrium states, with and without tariffs. The next results initiate an inquiry about the nature of this disequilibrium behavior. Result 6 is a statement about the behavior of output prices, the prices of Y and Z.
RESULT 6: Output prices are converging (in the weak sense) toward the competitive equilibrium from above.
Reference to Tables 5, 6 , and 7 reveals that, for environment 1 (no tariff) and environment 1 (tariff), both output prices are above the competitive equilibrium (as well as the autarky prediction) during the late periods of the experiment. This is true for both outputs. The convergence path is revealed by a comparison of Bli's and B2. In six of the eight possible cases under environment 1 (no tariff) and five of the six cases in environment 1 (tariff), the value of B1 's is above or equal to the value of B2 and is not as close to the competitive equilibrium as is the value of B2. For environment 2, prices are converging from above toward the competitive equilibrium in all 12 of the possible cases. Thus, the prices in early periods tend to be above the lateperiod prices, and the direction of movement over time is toward the competitiveequilibrium price.
While output prices move in a consistent way, as summarized by Result 6, input prices are more complex because of the nature of derived demand. The next result suggests that the deviation of factor prices from the competitive equilibrium is not only due to a lack of equilibrium in the output market prices, but factors have their own independent dynamic structure of adjustment. However, the direction of adjustment in the factor markets is toward the equilibria of the competitive model. RESULT 7: Factor prices are below marginal revenue products. That is, all of the input/output price ratios are below marginal products. The convergence is in the direction of the competitive-equilibrium relationship.
The condition for profit maximization under competitive conditions is simply that factor price equals marginal physical product times output price. Since production technologies are linear, the marginal physical product is a constant. It follows that the ratio of factor price to output price, when compared to marginal products, can then be used to determine whether the input conditions are satisfied. Table 9 contains estimates of the time path of ratios of output prices to input prices. The econometric model is of the same form as described earlier. The Bl1 variables measure the ratio during the first period, which is permitted to differ among experiments. The variable B2 measures the ratio as time goes to infinity. In 25 of the 26 possible cases, the B1i's are less than B2, and B2 is less than the competitive equilibrium. This indicates that, convergence to the competitive-equilibrium input/output price ratio, in the weak sense, is always present.
Two reasonable explanations of the observed input/output price behaviors summarized in Result 7 are consistent with behaviors found in other experimental markets. The first is that the asymmetry of rents received by sellers and buyers of the factors (sellers receive more rents) leads to lower transaction prices because rents are split (see Smith and Arlington W. Williams, 1982). However, if this is the explanation, then the factor prices should approach equilibrium from below. In all environments, as long as output prices are at or above the competitive-equilibria prices, producer surplus is greater than consumer surplus in the appropriate partial-equilibrium model. As is evident in Table 6 , factor prices in environment 2 do not approach the competitive equilibria from below.
Since factor prices do not approach equilibria from below in environment 2, this first (rent-splitting) explanation must be rejected. The other possible explanation is that the buyers of the factors face a market risk. The buyer may not be able to sell the final goods produced with the factor. In the experiments, producers must buy the input, then produce and sell the output. This takes time, and the possibilities that prices could change or that time could run out create real risks for producers. As a compensation to the producer for bearing this risk, a "return for risk-bearing," the factor/output price ratio starts low and adjusts upward. Risk of this type might be a general property of interdependent markets, and if it is, then the input/output price adjustments observed in the experiments might also be observed in the field. Regardless of the interesting separate dynamics, the most fundamental theoretical property derived from the competitive-equilibrium model still holds, as is captured by Result 8.
RESULT 8: Factor prices adjust across countries (in environment 2) as predicted by the factor-price-equalization principle.
In environment 2, competitive-equilibrium output prices are all the same (200-250), and competitive equilibrium in- put prices are all the same (200-225). A natural test is, thus, whether or not the difference between the factor prices in the two countries is zero. Table 10 contains the estimates which show that, for both input factors, the hypothesis that the prices are equal as t gets large cannot be rejected.
The equality of factor prices for our parameters in environment 2 is a theoretically sound result. Since the outputs trade internationally they must trade at the same price in the two countries. Therefore, because production technology is linear and identical in the two countries, the marginal revenue product of the inputs and therefore their wages should be the same even though the inputs themselves do not trade internationally. Interestingly, in our experiment, we observe equality of input prices across countries even though these input prices are not equal to the marginal revenue product of the inputs.
Since profits can be viewed as a return to a special input (risk-bearing), the pattern of profits is worthy of special investigation. In the competitive model, equilibrium profits from production are zero. The next result demonstrates that the patterns of profits follow the laws suggested by the competitive model.
RESULT 9: Profits from production are positive but fall over time.
Table 11 contains estimates of the time path of profits. As can be seen the Bli terms in every experiment are greater than the B2 term. Furthermore, B2 is significantly greater than zero. Since the B1i terms measure initial profits and the B2 term measures profits as time goes to infinity, the conclusion is obtained. Profits are higher at the beginning than later, and profits are positive.
Finally, we make three observations. The first is a summary about the autarky model which is included for completeness. Observations 2 and 3 are different. Neither observation has particular foundation in theory. However, following the statement of the observations, we provide a conjecture about the nature of the dynamics at work in these markets. If the conjecture is correct, then the third observation can be explained. 
The support is contained in previously stated results. In Results 2 and 3 the production data from environment 1 reveal that the systems of production and export for all goods are moving toward the competitive equilibrium and away from autarky. The production data from environment 2 seem to favor neither model. From Result 5, we see that tariffs had effects predicted by the competitive model, while autarky predicted that tariffs would have no effects. From Result 6 we find that output prices are converging to the competitive equilibrium, In the no-tarif condition, a large amount of exporting going back and forth between the two countries was observed. The trading appeared to be intemaational speculation and seemed to help markets converge.
Net exports constitute only 63.8 percent of total international trade under free trade in environment 1. The rest of the volume comprised units which had been or were being returned to their country of origin. When tariffs were imposed, the cross trading in Z was essentially eliminated.
OBSERVATION
3: Contrary to the prediction of the competitive model, the tariff reduced production efficiency.
SUPPORT:
Figure 8 contains world production data for the last few periods of experiments with tariffs and experiments without tariffs. These are periods after which some equilibration has taken place. Recall that in this version of the Ricardian model the tariff should have no influence on production. As is clear from the figure, production was less when the tariff existed.
Observation 3 indicates that the tariffs have costs beyond those predicted by the static competitive model. A review of some of the results presented above provides surprisingly strong support for a conjecture about the nature of the dynamics at work in these markets. Collecting Results 6, 7, 8, and 9, along with Observation 3, reveals a pattern of the disequilibrium dynamics. The system appears to be moving toward the competitive equilibria along a qualitatively distinctive path. The term "conjecture" is used because the path cannot be deduced from accepted theory, even though it is supported by much theoretical intuition.
An explanation of the dynamics, which we shall call the "risk-compensated input/ output price-adjustment process," begins with the observation that markets have an inherent randomness as part of the general equilibration process. This randomness creates a risk for producers who must commit to the purchase of resources and who face the possibility of losses if the product produced from the resources cannot be sold at sufficiently high prices. Accordingly, producers restrict purchase of resources and thus restrict production as they gather information about market conditions. The results are higher (than equilibrium) market prices in output markets due to restricted supplies and lower (than equilibrium) input prices due to restricted input demand. As the experience that producers gain from the market advances with the repetition and stationarity of parameters, the uncertainty diminishes (due to the accumulation of information about the market) and the randomness decreases (due to equilibration). Output expands, output prices fall, and input prices rise. The results are an increasing input/output price ratio over time and falling profits. The conjecture that follows is simply that disequilibrium behavior is characterized by such a process. CONJECTURE: Equilibration in the experiments follows the risk-compensated input/ output price-adjustment process.
All of the properties of the path, as described, are contained in the market data. Output prices converge toward the competitive equilibrium from above (Result 6). Input prices converge toward the competitive equilibrium (Results 7 and 8). Finally, producers' profits fall over time (Result 9) as the input/output price ratio increases.
The fact that input prices converge to the competitive equilibrium from below in environment 1 and converge from above in environment 2 is also consistent with the hypothesis. In environment 1 producers faced greater risks than in environment 2. In environment 2 producers were also consumers of factors, so factors unused in production were valuable to them as consumption. In environment 1 producers had no such alternatives, so the "down side" losses to producers were greater in environment 1 than in environment 2. The greater risk to producers in environment 1 would then be manifest in lower input prices.
Observation 3 is also consistent with the hypothesis that the disequilibrium is characterized by such a path. A tariff imposed on the imports of Z in country 1 (which has a comparative disadvantage in Z and thus consumes only imported Z in equilibrium) constitutes a major perturbation of the system. The natural tendency is for the price of Z in country 1 to be higher as a result of the tariffs. The risk-compensated input/ output price-adjustment process exacerbates the increase of the price of Z in country 1 in the early period of an experiment. With the price of imported Z very high in country 1 due to the combined effects, some Z gets produced in country 1. On the other hand, in country 2, market demand for Z is reduced because there is reduced demand for exports. Thus, in country 2 the price of Z falls, making Z less profitable for country-2 producers relative to the production of Y, whose market supply is reduced because some of the resources in country 1 are diverted to the production of Z. Some Y gets produced in country 2. Thus, along this disequilibrium path, country 1 (inefficiently) shifts production from a full specialization in the production of Y to include the production of some Z. Country 2 shifts from a complete specialization in the production of Z to include (inefficiently) the production of some Y. The resulting inefficiencies are captured in the data from the experiments as summarized by Observation 3 and are shown in Figure 8 .
Of course, there is nothing theoretically new about profits being a return to producers for bearing market uncertainty. The new and difficult (theoretical) challenge stems from the fact that markets seem to have a natural but inexplicable random component that is not captured by modern theory. The intuition that should support a theory seems clear, but no formal statement of such a theory currently exists. The natural reaction of agents to the inherent randomness would seem to be similar for any portfolio adjustment. The system adjustment to the individual hedging behavior appears natural enough. Since the path has such clearly distinguishable features, it will be of interest to explore other experiments as well as field data to see whether system adjustments, along the risk-compensated input/ output price path, is found in other places as well. It will also be of interest to learn whether the intuition captured by the explanation given above can be placed on solid theoretical footing.
VI. Conclusion
The main result of the paper is that we observe experimentally for the first time that the law of comparative advantage predicts patterns of trade and output. This result would not have been completely unanticipated by trade theorists, because it is so embedded in modern economic models. existed. In reviewing the material that follows, the reader should appreciate that each of these several instructions was generated by only a few word changes (e.g., "'and/or"' vs. "or"). A single paragraph added to the instructions explained the tariff in those experiments in which a tariff was operative. The instructions hold two additional sources of potential ambiguity. The first is the labeling of markets. Three sets of labels exist throughout the series. For example, in the text of this paper the input from country 1 is labeled as L . However, in the instructions read to subjects, this input was called W, and the trading activity of W took place in market 1 and is recorded that way in the data sets. Table Al lists all of the relationships. The word "paper" refers to the manuscript version of the text preceding this appendix; the word "instructions" refers to what subjects saw; and "data/markets" indicates the index as presented on computer screens during the experiment and in the data sets.
The second source of possible confusion is the assignment of subjects to agent types, such as consumer/producer. In 16-person experiments there is no confusion. Subjects in country i control resources and/or consume and/or produce in country i. In the eight-person sessions, the roles were different. The lack of subject numbers required functions of producer, consumer, and resource owner to be combined. Because of the small numbers, an oligopoly problem presented itself. If the producers own resources in their own country, then they could influence the activities of their competition by refusing to sell him/her the resources. In order to avoid this complicating factor, firms were producers/consumers in one country but owned resources in the other country. Thus, producers/consumers in country i were resource owners in country j. Of course resource owners still could not transport the resources from one country to another.
The set of instructions that follows is for the 16-person environment-1 experiments. The forms for the redemption value sheets (for consumption decisions) were the same for all treatments, as were the accounting forms. Blank examples of both are included at the end of the instructions. Of course, the redemption value sheets are filled in by the experimenter and the accounting sheets by the subject.
General Instructions [Exact Transcript]
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which you will be designated as one of two types of traders in a sequence of trading periods (either a type 1 or a type 2). Find your type at the top of the instructions. In your folder you have a sheet entitled Record Sheet. If you are a type 1, you will also have a Redemption Value Sheet. If you are a type 2 you will have a Production Schedule. These sheets will help you determine the value to you of any decisions that you might make. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THESE SHEETS TO ANYONE. They are your own private information.
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your final payoff will be in terms of dollars. The conversion rate is francs to 1 U.S. dollar. You will be paid at the end of the experiment.
There are four types of goods which can be traded in our market: W, X, Y, and Z. You may make profits in two ways, through consumption and through trading of the four goods. 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET (For Consumption
MARKET RESTRICTIONS
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. You may not trade in markets Unless you are informed otherwise these markets will be closed to you for the entire experiment.
You may be taxed for trading in market 6. The tax that you pay is francs for each unit that you buy or sell in that market. Unless you are informed otherwise, the tax will remain the same for the entire experiment.
